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maintaining institutional facts is power” (103). Deontic powers 
either prompt people to do something or exclude people from 
doing something “without using force” (147). For example, to 
declare that “Obama is President” or “Locke is the property 
owner” is to acknowledge their rights and obligations in those 
roles, to prompt them to fulfill those roles, and to exclude 
others from exercising the powers that accompany those roles. 
Feminists have long been interested in institutional terms like 
“husband” and “wife,” perhaps in part because of the deontic 
powers that tend to accompany each. Feminists have also 
been interested in the phenomenon of collective recognition 
in the sense that acceptance and internalization of some social 
norms has hindered personal development. For example, if 
one accepted the traditional conception of “wife” with all of its 
deontic “powers,” one would be disinclined to go to college, 
pursue a career in film-making or drag racing, etc. Although 
Searle describes the social world and institutional facts from 
a broadly analytic perspective, and although many feminists 
are rooted in the continental tradition, his account reinforces 
feminist concerns with vocabulary as an instrument of power. 
His account is also remarkably empowering. It reaffirms the 
notion that current power structures can be dismantled if 
enough people choose to stop believing in, or choose to create 
new, institutions.
Searle’s layered argument, moving from mind and 
intentionality to language and society, is at once technical and 
full of common sense. Those who are not terribly familiar with 
Searle are likely to get the most from this text. Those who have 
been following Searle’s ongoing discussion of social ontology 
may not be surprised by much of what he offers here. One might 
allege that Searle’s account is too tidy and comprehensive, 
relying on the single linguistic construct of the Status Function 
Declaration to ground out and explain the entirety of human 
civilization. Nonetheless, Searle presents a solid point of 
departure for further questions about social ontology and 
rightly reminds us that institutional facts are dynamic human 
creations.
Endnotes 
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“More Feminist Spinozists Thinking More”
The purpose of this volume, according to the editor Moira 
Gatens, is to show that “Feminist scholarship can offer new 
interpretative insights into the notoriously difficult philosophy 
of Benedict Spinoza”(1). This book successfully achieves this 
aim, and more. The articles in this volume show us that viewing 
Spinoza’s work with a feminist lens reveals neglected aspects 
of Spinoza’s philosophy; further, focusing on these neglected 
aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy exposes unexamined dualisms 
in feminist philosophers’ own practices and presuppositions. 
That is not to say that there is a unitary feminist lens. One of 
the strengths of this collection is the variety of backgrounds 
and methods of the contributors and the debates to which their 
commentaries belong. Liberal feminists, feminists from the 
psychoanalytic tradition, Marxist feminists, and those whose 
work bridges schools and traditions, all find in Spinoza’s work 
productive ideas with something to offer to the classic problems 
of feminist theory: the nature of social categories, sexuality, the 
fate of the passions and the imagination in philosophy.
Gatens’ introduction provides a good overview of Spinoza’s 
philosophy, highlighting those aspects that may be of particular 
interest to feminist theorists, which are taken up by contributors 
to the volume: the positive role of the imagination in Spinoza’s 
philosophy (Gatens, Lloyd, Grassi); Spinoza’s rejection of 
dualism (Gatens, Lloyd, Ravven, Strong, West, Donovan); 
Spinoza’s naturalistic but non-reductionist theory of the affects 
(Gatens, Ravven, Rorty, Matheron); Spinoza’s conception of 
relational freedom and the social self (Strong, Rorty, Lloyd, 
Ravven). Focusing particularly on aspects of Spinoza’s work that 
are neglected by mainstream scholarship, the articles collected 
here offer new and exciting interpretations of each. Amelie 
Rorty’s classic piece on Spinoza’s passions examines Spinoza’s 
understanding of how the passions can be reformed without 
thereby excising them, thus differentiating Spinoza from those 
who thought freedom involved being free of emotions. Rorty 
deftly performs spinozism by teaching us about love as first a 
passive and then an active affect through her example of the 
development of Ariadne’s love for Echo. Ariadne learns of the 
forces which caused her love for Echo, and learns what Echo 
is beyond her passionate love; thus, she is able to finally and 
actively love Echo not just as the object of her affection, but as 
a genuine individual, a singular part of nature.
Although Gatens admits that some Spinoza scholars may be 
surprised at what feminists can contribute to Spinoza scholarship, 
the bigger surprise may be that Spinoza has anything to offer 
contemporary feminists. How could Spinoza—an unapologetic 
metaphysician, a determinist, a rationalist, and a student of 
Hobbes’ political philosophy—have anything to say to the issues 
that matter to contemporary feminist philosophy? Alexandre 
Matheron, with his usual humor and facility with Spinoza’s texts, 
shows how Spinoza’s sole norm, “to understand,” can still lead 
us to radically rethink our present social conditions. Aurelia 
Strong proposes that Spinoza’s conception of the individual 
offers a way of capturing the insights both of liberalism and 
communitarianism without the drawbacks of either. Strong 
argues that Spinoza’s work thus offers a better framework for 
understanding the reciprocal relations between individuals and 
the social world, which provides the philosophical foundations 
for a notion of relational autonomy. Heidi Ravven and Genevieve 
Lloyd explore the ways in which Spinoza’s sometimes difficult 
philosophy sheds light on the extent to which feminist theorists’ 
own concepts and preconceptions work against them and 
contain traces of dualisms and religious traditions which 
feminists constantly critique.
One of the few new pieces for the collection, Ravven’s 
historical article argues that those feminists who reject 
determinism rely on a “magical” conception of the human 
person derived from Christianity. Ravven proposes that Spinoza’s 
understanding of individuals’ beliefs and desires as caused 
derives from a Judeo-Arabic tradition whereby individuals are 
understood as part of Nature, not outside of it. Ravven argues 
that Spinoza’s alternative conception of human nature enables 
us to see the way in which our conception of social reform is 
tied to a false picture of human freedom. Social reform does 
not require a “magical conception of the human persons” but 
rather requires understanding the actual forces, social, affective, 
and otherwise, that impinge upon each individual, causing 
their desires and shaping their self-conceptions. Reiterating the 
spinozist dictum to understand, Ravven proposes that Spinoza’s 
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method provides a route toward a mature non-moralistic ethics, 
one that would focus on what we are before telling us what we 
ought to do and be. Genevieve Lloyd, in a piece from her book 
Part of Nature, similarly shows that by focusing on Spinoza’s 
genuine alternative to Cartesian dualism, we can see that 
feminists’ critiques of dualism have been undermined by their 
adherence to the sex/gender distinction, which repeats the 
dualism of the sexed body and the gendered mind, the latter 
a “social construction” which, because not biological we are 
magically free to change.
Reservations
This is an essential book for any research library, and the 
best collection yet showing both what feminists have to say 
about Spinoza and what Spinoza has to offer contemporary 
feminism. While there is much to commend this volume, as 
someone familiar with the series and with the research area, I 
found it somewhat disappointing. First of all, and immediately 
recognizable to anyone who has ever handled the books in 
this series: it’s a bit light. Weighing in at a mere 239 pages, 
Feminist Interpretations of Benedict Spinoza has 119 pages 
less than the average for the series (358 pages) with some of 
the larger volumes near 500 pages. Is there half as much to say 
about feminism and Spinoza as there is about feminism and 
Ayn Rand? (432 pages) Is there less to say about Spinoza than 
Rousseau, one who took so much from Spinoza while publically 
offering him only insult? (480 pages) Is there less to say about 
Spinoza than Descartes, whose dualism Spinoza rejected so 
completely? (348 pages) While portability is an asset, I found 
myself wanting more.
Further, more than half of the articles in the book have been 
publically available for nearly 20 years. The paperback edition 
contains eleven articles, seven of which have been published 
elsewhere, most in the early-mid nineties. The impression this 
slight book gives is that there were once some philosophers 
writing about the intersections of feminism and Spinoza, but 
that this project is now over. As such the volume’s diversity 
seems to suggest that the work on Spinoza and feminism 
is haphazard and disconnected, rather than as indicators of 
the vibrant and growing research program I believe it to be. 
Although I am indebted to Gatens’ work philosophically, I am 
disappointed with this edited volume. Its brevity is evidence of 
a missed opportunity to showcase the brilliant work done by 
feminist spinozists in the last 15 years. 
These articles, in their original forms, inspired a research 
program in spinozistic feminism, which offered a new way 
to approach the reality and power of bodies, a new way to 
understand how the path to reason can be approached only 
through understanding the affects, and a new way to understand 
the self as social. This new work on Spinoza and feminism, 
which was inspired by Gatens, Lloyd, Ravven, and Rorty, needs 
its own volume indicating the current and flourishing state of 
international work on Spinoza. Hasana Sharp ends her review 
of this book with the hope that it will be the prolegomenon 
for work yet to come. I’d like to second her suggestion with 
the caveat that perhaps the material conditions for such a 
volume need to come first: a conference, a society, or both 
for the burgeoning field of Spinoza studies taking seriously the 
problems of feminism, or rather the field of feminist philosophy 
taking up Spinoza’s ideas.
Spinoza did not think that the sage, alone and separate from 
the rest of humanity, was the ideal or most powerful state for 
humans. Even the freest individual was weak when considered 
alone, disconnected from others; one’s power was miniscule 
when compared to the whole of nature. Only through joining 
with others can the free individual increase his or her power. 
This is helpful advice for the as yet to be called into being society 
of feminist spinozists, existing as we do in the often inhospitable 
universe of academic philosophy. So, I don’t blame or excoriate 
Gatens for having disappointed specialists. The geographic 
distance and the linguistic and academic differences that 
separate feminist philosophers working on Spinoza today is 
daunting. Overcoming these obstacles requires the work of 
more than just one individual.
Conclusion
Feminist Interpretations of Benedict Spinoza offers us a glimpse 
of the possibilities of the intersections of Spinoza’s philosophy 
and feminist theory, but only a glimpse. Readers looking for an 
introduction to the feminist interpretation of Spinoza should 
look to Lloyd and Gatens’ previous work, Collective Imaginings, 
for a systematic elaboration of their ideas, including their view 
of the usefulness of Spinoza’s conception of responsibility. For 
those feminist theorists who have already recognized the value 
of Spinoza’s philosophy, this review is a call to action. Feminist 
spinozism is an extremely promising area of philosophical 
research. However, the brevity of this collection and the age 
of many of its articles tell us that those feminists working on 
Spinoza’s philosophy today are not working together, and are 
not communicating their work to one another well enough. 
We need something that might link those feminist luminaries 
with young scholars, which might bring together the strands 
of Spinoza scholars with feminist inclinations from their varied 
locations around the globe. If there were such a group, such 
communication, this book would have been different, heftier 
at least. In conclusion: this is a good start, but we need more 
feminist spinozists thinking more!
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Think of the chapters of Penny A. Weiss’s slim book, Canon 
Fodder: Historical Women Political Thinkers, as a philosophical 
dim sum or tapas: small, varied, and intensely flavored morsels 
that can be consumed in any order, savored, and contemplated. 
Most of the chapters are independently satisfying, and each 
leaves one wondering where a more extensive treatment might 
lead. The book itself extends an invitation—even a demand—for 
philosophers to continue enriching the field by engaging with 
the contributions of historical women writers.
Weiss’s essays address several authors stretching over one 
thousand years: Sei Shōnagon, Christine de Pizan, Mary Astell, 
Mary Wollstonecraft, Anna Julia Cooper, Emma Goldman, 
and the authors of the Declaration of Sentiments. The framing 
principle is a desire to reshape radically the landscape of 
political theory, and this eclectic list possesses a kind of internal 
logic; each writer explores central but neglected concepts 
that could contribute significantly to transforming political 
philosophy. The concepts include a creative methodology for 
comprehending the world, musings on the politics of inclusion, 
marriage, and the state of nature, community and friendship, 
equality of gender within the polity, community and harmony, 
and children. Considering this list (lists are important in this 
book) the cluster of ideas could be loosely formed into a partial 
